This paper tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from mainly young firms. We find this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do so, we employ a methodology similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) on three digit manufacturing industry-level data provided by the United Nations Statistics Division for about 15 developed and developing countries in over 20 industries on average. We show that price-cost margins in externally more financially dependent industries are higher during crisis than in externally less dependent industries in countries with higher levels of corruption. We find the opposite relationship for the change in the industry-level number of establishments during a crisis. The results withstand an array of robustness checks, including using different indices of corruption, different controls, and robust estimation techniques.
This paper studies the effect of corruption on access to finance and its impact in times of systemic banking crises on the real sector. It asks the basic question: do incumbents try to curtail access to external finance for their competitors during systemic banking crises? Indeed, the paper empirically identifies access to finance as a likely candidate which incumbents may manipulate to "starve" their weaker competitors from credit during a crisis to safeguard their own rents. Hence this paper adds to the relatively small body of empirical literature on mechanisms through which access to finance affects real activity during financial crises. More specifically, it identifies an explicit "political economy of finance" channel through which special interests distort the level-playing field during crises. Furthermore, to the extent that the politics of incumbent rents affect the economic growth trajectory of a country, the results support the findings of the finance and growth literature and reconfirm the large literature which attests to the first order importance of institutions on economic development.
The basic idea originates from the theoretical model in Feijen and Perotti (2005) where rich entrepreneurs lobby politicians to restrict access to finance for poor entrepreneurs in bad economic times. It builds a model where all agents have identical, positive net present value projects and are all subject to an economy-wide exogenous shock with a certain probability. Agents have either high or low endowment (i.e., are rich or poor). In the event of a shock, all agents need to raise extra immediate funds externally. If they are unable to do so, they are forced to default inefficiently. Given the probability of a shock, the model predicts that rich entrepreneurs in countries with poor political checks and balances are more likely to lobby ex ante for lower investor protection. The motive is that in a context of low investor protection, poorer, more highly leveraged entrepreneurs are denied the extra funds in case of a shock and are forced to exit the market, which raises the rents of the rich during a decrease in competition. In this paper, we test the general interpretation of this model: when outright denial of ex ante finance for entrants is impossible or too costly, connected firms will lobby for a fragile financial system which leads to a reduction of competition during an exogenous shock, like a banking crisis.
To empirically test whether lobbying over access to finance is used by incumbents to reduce competition, we need a proxy to assess the effect of their ability to affect access to finance, thereby keeping their profits high. For this purpose, we interpret the change of the industry-level average Lerner index or price-cost margin (henceforth PCM) during a systemic banking crisis as a measure of profitability of "strong", incumbent firms, which are most likely to withstand a crisis because they are well-connected. We are not the first one to analyze PCMs as a measure of (political) strength. Also Braun and Raddatz (2005) interpret change in PCMs during trade liberalization as a proxy for shift in the incumbent's political and economic power.
In the same spirit, we interpret fewer number of establishments (henceforth EST) during a crisis as more beneficial to incumbent or "strong" firms. Others also have analyzed the number of establishments of the data we use (see Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Fisman and Sarria-Allende, 2004; Perotti and Volpin, 2004) .
We analyze the changes in PCM and EST associated with systemic banking crises across industries in both developed and developing countries. Industry-level PCMs are defined as total net profit over value of total output and are traditionally interpreted as a measure of incumbent monopoly rents and an inverse proxy for the degree of competition in an industry. Theoretically, the PCM can range from zero to one, where a value of zero indicates an industry described by perfect competition. A value of one represents a pure monopolistic industry structure. However, in practice one needs to be a bit careful in interpreting PCMs as proxies for monopoly power, since the Lerner Index of monopoly power is calculated using marginal, not average costs and assumes the industry is in equilibrium. This is not too worrisome since we only need to interpret the PCM as a proxy for the average profitability in the industry.
How does a systemic banking crisis affect the industry PCMs?
1 The adverse shock of a crisis increases the need for immediate capital because of, for example, possibly soaring input prices, an increasing interest burden on debt or banks that try to call in their outstanding loans due to their own liquidity constraints. Worse, the subsequent drying up of credit markets, a typical consequence of banking crises, could make firms even more tightly liquidity constrained, forcing them either to default, resulting in a reduction of the EST, or to downsize output substantially because of a shortage of working capital. This is exacerbated in most emerging markets, since bank lending is the most prevalent form of external finance. Indeed, Claessens, Djankov, and Ferri (1999) estimate that about 30 percent of corporations in crisis-affected East Asian countries were insolvent in the fall of 1998. More than twice as many firms in these countries suffered illiquidity. This results in a reduction of total output, which may have a positive effect on the PCM via upward pressure on prices, ceteris paribus.
Incumbents benefit relatively more from a high PCM and a decrease in the EST.
These "strong" firms have close ties with politicians and banks. Claessens et al. (2003) document that significantly fewer firms that were affiliated with firm groups or banks filed for bankruptcy, suggesting their connections provided them with the (financial) means necessary to weather the crisis. Faccio (2004) finds that strong connections between firms and politicians are particularly common for large firms in countries that are generally perceived as being highly corrupt. She finds that businesspeople entering politics has a positive effect on the stock value of the associated companies. Fisman (2001) shows that the stock value of politically connected firms in Suharto's Indonesia declined more when adverse rumors circulated about the health of the president.
In addition, we assume "strong" firms are able and willing to press investors, notably banks, to make access to finance for "weak" firms more difficult in terms of rates and volume. The incentive to do so should be always present, but is even higher during a crisis when "weak" competitors are financially most vulnerable. Furthermore, we assume that average costs of "strong" firms do not increase relative to their "weaker"
competitors. Again, we expect this is largely, but certainly not exclusively, due to the access to finance channel. For example, economies of scale, bribing or usage of political connections of "stronger" firms to pursue different channels to reach their goals could also adversely affect the change in relative average costs for "weaker" firms during crises. Demand changes during a crisis equally affect "strong" and "weak" firms, so if these assumptions are satisfied, higher industry-level PCMs during crises benefit "strong" firms more -or hurt them less -relative to "weak" firms.
An analogous story can be told for the interpretation of the EST. If there is a significant decrease in the EST during a crisis, it is most likely that "weak" firms have left the market, which diminishes competition for "strong" firms.
Under these assumptions, the main idea put forth in this paper is as follows.
"Strong", connected firms in industries where young firms are more dependent on external finance will be relatively more profitable during banking crises. Empirically, this implies that in more corrupt countries during systemic banking crises, industries where young firms are more dependent on external finance experience:
• Hypothesis 1: higher price-cost margins (PCMs).
• Hypothesis 2: fewer number of establishments (EST).
We find that the data support these hypotheses, even after performing an array of robustness checks. To consider the effect of the hypotheses, we use the regression coefficients to predict what the PCM difference would be between high dependent and less dependent industries for a high and a low corrupt country. This difference is relatively larger in more corrupt countries. The regression models predict that the difference in PCM change between a high and low dependent industry -the 75 th and 25 th percentile -to be 2.9 percent lower in a less corrupt country -taken at the 75 th percentile -compared to a high corrupt country -taken at the 25 th percentile (note that a higher corruption index means less corruption). For comparison, the average relative PCM change for the universe of calculated PCM changes is 5 percent. Therefore, a differential change of -2.9 percent due to an improvement in the corruption index from 3 to 4.1 represents a large decrease. A similar analysis yields that the relative change in EST is 2.1 percent higher due to an improvement in the corruption index from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile. Given that the average relative EST change during crisis is -5.2 percent, this a large increase.
In addition, by adopting quantile regression techniques, we find that the effect of Hypothesis 1 is non-linear and is substantially magnified in those countries with very high levels of corruption.
Interestingly, in the robustness checks, we find that PCMs in industries which are more "opaque", i.e. divulge less information via prices in the stock market, have relatively higher PCMs and less EST in countries which are more corrupt. This finding suggests that a "smoke screen" encourages manipulation to weaken competitors.
Furthermore, there is a strong indication that the regressions do not suffer from endogeneity problems. There are at least two reasons. First, we use pre-crisis explanatory variables. Second, intuitively, it seems quite unlikely that the dependent variable has a direct contemporaneous effect on the level of corruption, since we know that institutions do not vary substantially over time or will only do so with large lags (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) ).
A few remarks on the limitations of the results are in order. Besides the reliability of the data and the possible distortions which arise from a lack of data availability, the methodology leaves some questions unanswered. For instance, the data only allow us to treat the relationship between access to finance and corruption as a "black box": we cannot infer how corruption affects access to finance. Furthermore, we are unable to infer whether the reduction in competition is welfare decreasing. For example, the data do not directly tell whether exiting or shrinking of some bad performing firms is actually welfare improving. Moreover, an industry with higher rents for firms can be welfare improving since it will have enough net worth to be less conducive to risk shifting incentives. Also, we are not able to assess the extent to which banks initiate the effect. In theory, banks may have strong incentives to deny access to credit to weaker, but otherwise healthy firms during banking crisis to artificially diminish competition and enhance the present value of their other outstanding loans in the industry. This is arguably easier to accomplish in countries with high corruption.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section I reviews the related literature and Section II explains the methodology used. Section III describes the data and Section IV presents the main results. Section V presents the robustness checks of the main results and Section VI concludes.
I. Related literature
In this section we describe several parts of the economic literature relevant for this paper.
Thus far, the literature has not paid much attention to the intersection of the real impact of crises, institutions, and access to finance. Therefore this paper is related to several parts of the finance literature. First, there is the literature which focuses on the relationship between institutions, financial development and economic growth. Its finance and growth strand has empirically established the connection between financial development and economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Jayratne and Strahan, 1996; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000; Levine, 2005) . More financially developed systems allow easier access to external finance by, for example, alleviating moral hazard and adverse selection problems, enabling firms to grow faster. Access to finance alone is not enough. show in a study on firms in post-communist countries that even thought bank loans are available, firms are reluctant to reinvest when property rights are weak. Braun and Raddatz (2005) offer a political economy view on financial development. They find that countries that liberalized their trade subsequently improved in terms of their financial development if the difference in change due to the liberalization of the average PCM of industries that benefited from liberalization was larger than that of industries that suffered from it. Also relevant is the law and finance strand, which established the link between the quality of the institutional framework and the development of the financial sector (La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et al. 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; and Beck et al., 2003 suggesting that access to finance in crises indeed is important. In addition, political and economic elites have an incentive to shift the burden of crises or at least suffer less from it, possibly magnifying the detrimental effects of the crisis in the process. Keefer (undated) builds a model where favors between special interests and politicians make the economy less resilient to external shocks and can lead to a financial crisis. Empirically, he finds that these factors largely explain the fiscal costs of a crisis. Halac and Schmukler (2003) find that in Latin America higher income classes did particularly better at the expense of social welfare due to financial transfers from banks during banking crises. Johnson and Mitton (2001) provide empirical evidence that the imposition of the September 1998 Malaysian capital controls during the Asian financial crises benefited primarily firms with strong connections to Prime Minister Mahathir. Johnson et al. (1999) present empirical support that bad corporate governance, specifically a lack of minority shareholder protection, explains stock market declines better than the usual macroeconomic variables. They hypothesize that the drop in asset prices is because managers have larger expropriation incentives during a crisis.
II. Methodology
This section discusses the econometric methodology. We expand the methodology used in Rajan and Zingales (1998, RZ henceforth), which assesses the relationship between the cross-country real growth of sectoral value added and the level of sophistication of the financial system. Their main hypothesis is that if access to finance is paramount for firm growth, then real added value of industries which inherently rely more heavily on external finance should grow faster in countries with better developed financial systems.
To curb identification problems and the criticism of omitted variable bias or model specification, they interact a country-specific variable (a proxy for the level of financial development) with an industry-specific variable (a proxy for dependence on external finance) besides using country-and industry-fixed effects in their regressions. To control for growth differences of industries across countries they use sectoral value added as a fraction of total value added in a country in 1980. A crucial assumption made by RZ is that industries in all countries have a natural external dependence level in common. They calculate this level by using industries in the United States as a benchmark. The rationale to use the United States is that, because its financial system is open and relatively frictionless, it is easy for US firms to attain their desired financial structure. To overcome potential endogeneity problems, they drop the United States from the regressions. RZ find a positive and significant sign for the interaction between the level of financial development in a country and the industry-specific need for external finance, which supports their hypothesis: higher financial development indeed spurs industry growth more in industries which are more dependent on external finance. According to Hypothesis 1, we expect the coefficient of the interaction term, 2 β , to be negative and significant only when we use a corruption index in the interaction term. This means that for more dependent industries in less corrupt countries, the drop of its PCM during a crisis is significantly deeper. This implies that the depressing effect of weakening demand was not compensated for by the uplifting effect of a significant drop in output and competition, causing a larger slide of the PCM. Hence we can interpret this as evidence that young firms in externally dependent sectors have better access to finance during a crisis in less corrupt countries.
According to Hypothesis 2, we expect the sign of the interaction term, 2 β , to be positive and significant only when we use a corruption index in the interaction term. This suggests that for more dependent industries in less corrupt countries, more (young) firms survive the crisis because of better access to finance.
III. Data
This section describes the construction and sources of the data which we used in the
analyses. An overview of the variables we used, their definitions, and their sources can be found in Table I . Summary statistics for the datasets used in the regressions are in Table III 
IV. Main Results
This section deals with the main results of the paper and some initial robustness checks.
All standard errors for OLS regressions reported in the paper are robust to heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White estimator of variance. In the main results, we focus on access to finance for young firms as being the specific channel through which DPCMREL and DESTREL are affected. For DPCMREL, the results are reported in Table VII , Columns (1)- (4), where external dependence is interacted with several institutional indices. They reflect the basic result for Hypothesis 1 of the paper.
We can see that the interaction term for corruption is significant on the 1% level and positive, suggesting that indeed PCMs are higher during crises in industries which are dependent on external finance in countries with higher corruption, also after controlling for financial development, presented in Columns (5)- (8). Corruption seems to be the most important factor, since the interaction term of external dependence and other institutional indices are not significant. This provides a robustness check on the channel of corruption. Only in Column (8) is the interaction of the average institutional index is significant, which is probably driven by the Corruption index.
We can use the regression coefficient estimates of Table VII The estimated coefficient for the interaction term in Regression 5 of Table VII equals -0.052 and we can set the industry's initial share of manufacturing at its overall mean. The regression coefficient estimates therefore predicts the difference in relative PCM change between the 75 th and 25 th percentile of external dependence is 2.9 percent lower in a country with a corruption index of 3 compared to one with an index of 4.1. For comparison, the average relative PCM change during crisis is 5 percent. Therefore, a differential change of -2.9 percent due to an improvement in the corruption index from 3 to 4.1 represents a large decrease.
For DESTREL, the main results can be found in Table VIII 
V. Robustness Checks
This section contains several robustness checks of the main result. Tables VII and VIII showed that the results are robust to controlling for financial development.
First, the data seem to support that indeed young firms are most adversely affected. We conclude this because the results in Tables VIII and IX can not be replicated when using the external dependence measure of RZ for all firms. In that case none of the interaction terms are significant. These results are presented in Table IX , Columns (1) and (3).
Furthermore, we ran the regressions using the difference in external dependence between young and mature firms instead of young firms only (Columns (2) and (4) Third, the results are robust to using an alternative measure of financial development: total domestic credit to GDP. The results are reported in Table X . Fifth, there might be a misspecification when the interaction term is correlated with omitted country variables which affect the dependent variable. Therefore we dropped the country-level variables and used other country controls. We employed GDP per capita, inflation, total domestic credit over GDP, domestic credit via banks over GDP, and the corruption index. As usual, the controls are pre-crisis averages. Table XII reports the results.
The results are robust to different specifications, and get stronger when more variables are added to the model. Although the sample size shrinks when more variables are added, it is noteworthy to state that the coefficients are close to the coefficients in the main results.
Sixth, as a further robustness check, we transformed the corruption variable in the interaction term into a dummy which takes a value of one if the corruption index is higher than the median, and zero otherwise. This new interaction term is positive and highly significant for DESTREL (Table XIII , Column (6)). However, it is no longer significant when explaining DPCMREL (Table XIII , Column (3)). To investigate this, we ran the regressions for the sub samples which have higher and lower values of corruption. To reduce the effect of outliers, the 1% tails of the dependent variable are dropped. (7 observations) Table XIII reports the results.
Column (1) shows that for the most corrupt countries, the interaction term is again significant. However, it is not for countries with low levels of corruption (Column (2)).
To check for non-linearity, we added a second interaction term with a squared corruption index (Column (3)). Both interaction terms are also highly significant for the complete sample, using Iteratively Weighted Least Squares to reduce the impact of outliers. The coefficients indicate that when the corruption index takes on a value of around 4.6, the marginal effect of the interaction terms is almost zero. Hence, these results indicate that impact of the interaction term is largest for the most corrupt countries. To check this, we ran three quantile regressions (for 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9) 7 . We expect that the effect is highest for the highest quantile of the DPCMREL distribution, since the hypothesis indicates those countries should be most corrupt. Indeed, Columns (4)- (6) show that the value of the interaction term doubles for the 0.9 quantile relative to the other quantiles. Although we don't provide a theory for the decreasing coefficient for the pre-crisis PCM, this perhaps can be interpreted that collusive behavior becomes unsustainable in the event of an exogenous shock.
Seventh, the results are robust to including time dummies to correct for the general external environment of the crisis (not reported).
Eighth, the country dummies implicitly control for the severity of the crisis and the accompanying effect of a currency devaluation on the terms of trade. However in addition to Table XII , we also explicitly want to control for changes in the terms of trade. Table XIV produces the results. The interaction term with corruption remains significant for both the change in PCM as the number of establishments.
Finally, we performed a more general check whether access to finance is opportunistically curtailed for young firms. We explored the effect of the informativeness of industries on the dependent variables. Informativeness can be seen as a proxy for financial development. Since, unlike RZ's external dependence, this index is not based on accounting measures, it is more exogenous to the model. In doing so, we ran a regression similar to Equation ( Y is DPCMREL, suggesting that in more opaque industries in countries which are corrupt, the PMC is relatively high during crises. We expect the opposite to be true for DESTREL.
The results are reported in columns (1)-(4) of Table XV . Explaining DPCMREL in
Column (1) and (2), we see that the interaction term is highly significant at the 1% level and has the expected sign, also after controlling for financial development of the banking system. The effect is as expected, but less strong when trying to explain DESTREL in Column (1) and (2), and only significant at the 10% level after controlling for financial development. Interestingly, the informativeness measure and the external dependence of young firms is negative and significant (ρ= -0.67 and p=0.00) and less so for dependence of all firms (ρ= -0.36 and p=0.01).
VI. Conclusion
The main question this paper addresses is whether incumbents use their connections to curtail access to finance during a systemic banking crisis to weaken or even eliminate their younger competitors. The data provide support for this view. Our main finding is that industries in which young firms are highly dependent on external finance have (1) relatively high price-cost margins (PCMs) and (2) relatively fewer establishments during systemic banking crises in countries with higher corruption indices. These results withstand an array of robustness checks, including different controls, and robust estimation techniques. Combined, we can regard these results as indirect evidence that powerful interests -strong, well-connected firms and/or their banks -are able to restrict access to finance during a crisis for younger firms, forcing them to significantly reduce output or even to default. Furthermore, we find that the described effect on the relative PCM change is disproportionately higher in countries with higher corruption.
Interestingly, we also find that the PCM is higher during crises in informationally more opaque industries -a measure of industry stock price comovement-in more corrupt countries experience relatively higher PCMs, suggesting that a "smoke screen" leads to malpractices in general, where the financial channel is just one of many ways to weaken competitors.
The findings may have policy implications. They indicate that the effect of corruption on access to finance can play an important role in the impact of banking crises on the post-crisis structure of the real sector. 3 -5.2% is the average for the universe for which DESTREL could be calculated. The average for the sample used for the regressions can be found in Table III . 4 However, when the 1% tails of the DPCMREL distribution are dropped, the interaction terms become significant for both new measures of external dependence. 5 Iteratively Least Squares takes outliers into account by assigning a weight to each observation with higher weights given to "better behaved" observations. Least Absolute Values is in fact a median regression where the absolute deviations from the median are used to calculate the coefficients. 6 Transparency International started constructing the index in 1995, but not for all countries. Therefore we use 1996 and 1997. 7 Quantile regressions use the whole sample to estimate the coefficients for the conditional expected value of the desired quantile. The 0.5-quantile is a special case, where the conditional median value is estimated. 8 We took the measure from Huang (2005) . Huang reports that this index does not change much over time.
Huang follows Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) and uses "relative firm-specific stock return variations" to measure stock price informativeness at the industry level. 
Corruption (TI)
The average Corruption Perceptions Index of a country over 1996 and 1997. The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The index is on a scale from 1 to 10. Source: Transparency International. KKZ A composite of six governance indicators (1998 data): voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption. Higher values correspond to better governance. Source: Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999).
Total Credit to GDP
Average total domestic (% of GDP) in the pre-crisis period. Source: World Development Indicators.
Credit via banks to GDP Average domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) in the pre-crisis period. Source: World Development Indicators.
Inflation
Average inflation in the pre-crisis period. Source: World Development Indicators.
GDP per capita Average GDP per capita in 1995 US $ in the pre-crisis period. Source: World Development Indicators. This table shows summary statistics on the national level for which we have enough data to construct differences in industry-level price-cost margins (PCMs) between the crisis and pre-crisis period. The PCM is defined as value added minus wages and salaries over value of total output. The pre-crisis period is defined as [t-8, t-3] and the crisis period is defined as [t-1, t+1] , where t is the first year of the first systemic banking crisis in a country according to Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) . DPCM is the absolute difference in PCM between the crisis and the pre-crisis period. DPCMREL is the relative difference. The Corruption, Accountability, and Law and Order institutional indices are on a scale from 0 to 6, where a higher score indicates a better institution. The Institutional index is a composite of all institutional indices. Institutional indices are drawn from ICRG. Credit via Banks is the domestic credit as a % of GDP from the WDI. Credit to GDP, GDP per capita, and Inflation are all from the WDI. This table shows averages of variables on the national level which we used for regressions with as dependent variable the relative change in industry-level number of establishments (DESTREL) between the crisis and pre-crisis period. We excluded observations whose DESTREL was not in the interval (-1,1) . The pre-crisis period is defined as [t-8, t-3] and the crisis period is defined as [t-1, t+1] , where t is the first year of the first systemic banking crisis in a country according to Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) . DEST is the absolute difference in the EST between the crisis and the pre-crisis period. DESTREL is the relative difference. The corruption, Accountability, and Law and Order institutional indices are on a scale from 0 to 6, where a higher score indicates a better institution. The dependent variable is either the relative change in industry-level price-cost margins during a crisis (DPCMREL) or the relative change in the number of establishments during a crisis (DESTREL). The independent variables are the average price-cost margin before the crisis and the average number of establishments before the crisis, respectively. The common independent variables are several interaction terms of external dependence of young firms and country-level variables 1) corruption (ICRG), 2) law and order (ICRG), 3) accountability (ICRG), 4) an average of these indices, and 5) domestic credit via banks to GDP (WDI). For the Corruption index, a higher value means less corruption. One percent tails of the DESTREL distribution in the basic sample have been dropped from the analysis to reduce the effect of outliers. *, **. *** indicate significance at 10%., 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Table XI Robustness: Using other Corruption Indices
The dependent variable is either the relative change in industry-level price-cost margins during a crisis (DPCMREL) or the relative change in the number of establishments during a crisis (DESTREL). The independent variables are the average PCM before the crisis and the average number of establishments before the crisis, respectively. Common independent variables are an interaction of the external dependence of young firms and domestic credit via banks to GDP and an interaction of the external dependence of young firms and Corruption (TI). Corruption (TI) is the average of the Corruption Perceptions Index over the years 1995, 1996, and 1997 The dependent variable is either the relative change in industry-level price-cost margins (PCMs) during a crisis (DPCMREL) or the relative change in the number of institutions during a crisis (DESTREL). The independent variables are the average PCM (number of establishments) before the crisis and several interaction terms of external dependence of young firms and country-level variables 1) corruption (ICRG), 2) Domestic credit to GDP (WDI), 3) a corruption dummy, and 4) Domestic credit via banks to GDP (WDI). For the Corruption index, a higher value means less corruption. Further independent variables are the Institutional Index (ICRG), Inflation (WDI), and GDP per capita (WDI). *, **. *** indicate significance at 10%., 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is either the relative change in industry-level price-cost margins (PCMs) during a crisis (DPCMREL) or the relative change in the number of institutions during a crisis (DESTREL). The independent variables are the average PCM (number of establishments) before the crisis and several interaction terms of external dependence of young firms and country-level variables 1) corruption (ICRG), 2) Domestic credit to GDP (WDI), 3) a corruption dummy, 4) Domestic credit via banks to GDP (WDI), and 5) change in the terms of trade (WDI). For the Corruption index, a higher value means less corruption. Further independent variables are the Institutional Index (ICRG), Inflation (WDI), and GDP per capita (WDI). *, **. *** indicate significance at 10%., 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is either the relative change in industry-level price-cost margins (PCMs) during a crisis (DPCMREL) or the relative change in the number of institutions during a crisis (DESTREL). The independent variables are the average price-cost margin (PCM) (number of establishments) before the crisis and two interaction terms of industry informativeness with Corruption (ICRG) and external dependence of young firms and Domestic credit via banks to GDP (WDI). For the Corruption index, a higher value means less corruption. The information variable is taken from Huang (2005) ; a higher value means more informative. One percent tails of the DESTREL distribution in the basic sample have been dropped from the analysis to reduce the effect of extreme values. *, **. *** indicate significance at 10%., 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
